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### THE PROBLEM OF ANTHROPOLOGY.<sup>1</sup>

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF LUDWIG NOIRÉ BY M. B. BONNER.

The German word for *Art*, "*Kunst*" is derived from "können" (to be able to do something). It signifies everything that an animate being can work or accomplish with *consciousness* and at *any time*—consequently not by chance, not by a happy coincidence of outward circumstances, nor under constraint of a foreign superior judgment, nor a foreign overpowering will. The breaking in of animals and the training of laborers and slaves to (to them) unintelligible tasks—even if the former appear ever so artistic, and the latter produce beautiful works of art—are for this reason excluded from the idea of *Art*.

Accordingly, the idea of Art involves in its inmost essence—and this even in its very lowest manifestations in the animal world—the idea of *Liberty* (*Freiheit*—freedom); indeed, the latter is in reality built on the former, for a being has only as much liberty as it can gain and maintain for itself; and with Goethe we may call it the final conclusion of wisdom, that only he, who daily conquers them, deserves life and liberty.

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<sup>1</sup> "Das Problem der Anthropologie: Die menschliche Kunst und ihre Bedingungen." Von Prof. Dr. Ludwig Noiré.

For this reason Kant's<sup>1</sup> saying concerning human art is so true and to the point: "that only the productions of LIBERTY—*i. e.*, of a Volition that founds its actions on reason—ought properly to be called Art." If we generalize this clear and luminous definition, so that it may also include the Art of the animal world, there remain as the two most important attributes Volition and Consciousness of action. By virtue of this definition large fields of animal activity must be excluded from the idea of Art. Foremost the organic functions, as breathing, digestion, change of matter, the circulation of the blood, etc. Firstly, the attribute of Volition is wanting in them. Though all these vital functions certainly originate in some activity of the will, this latter is confined in such narrow bounds that the expression to be used in speaking of them is: "The animal *must* do all this"; not, it is *able* to ("*can*") do it—it is function, not art. Secondly, the degree of consciousness of action is so obscure that these activities appear to us as *inner* processes, not illumined by any coincidence with the external world, but, as it were, unconscious, going on with mechanical exactness and continuity; accordingly we can in these cases only speak of unity of will and effect, but not of consciousness. What there is wanting is the imaginative faculty, the soul of all true consciousness, of which the external senses are the principal media.

Nevertheless, we are obliged to exclude the activity of these senses from the precincts of art. We must not say that seeing, tasting, smelling—astonishing activities as they are, and bound to certain organs or implements—belong to animal art. What are wanting are liberty and volition, and especially an effect on the outer world.

The cause of this lies in the fundamental relation in which each individual—*i. e.*, "limited" being—stands to the rest of the world. This fundamental relation is that of subject and object. As the result of this relation, we have the fundamental distinction between *feeling* and *volition*, both only subjective qualities, but both only possible through relation to something external, an object. There can neither be a feeling which is not caused by some change in external relations, nor a volition that has not a goal, an external object on which it tries to "realize" itself.

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<sup>1</sup>"Kritik der Urtheilskraft," p. 171, edition Rosenkranz.

Though volition is the real fundamental instinct and the true essence of all things, still in itself it is only a dim impulse, a blind instinct, which only grows enlightened in the measure that sensation conveys to it more and more knowledge of the external world, and thereby effects a constantly increasing relation between the two. The will remains unaltered, but the motives on which it reacts increase. There is then, even in the lowest species of animals—among which one can hardly speak of higher perceptions than those conveyed by the sense of touch and instincts for sustenance—nevertheless, a consciousness of a constant change in an objective outer world which is intimately connected with the animal's interests in life. This change of sensations forms the real substance of its life; as it were, the matter of the total consciousness of the animal, for its entire attention and all exertions of its will are directed toward it.<sup>1</sup>

As, according to this, all knowledge of the external world can only enter consciousness as an effect on the external senses; as, furthermore, every effect on the external world, especially among the higher animals, is controlled by the senses, and in every case is *felt* as counter-action or reflex—it is easy to understand why feeling is clearly separated from the real acts of volition, and, in spite of its eminent importance for the accomplishment of all consciousness, is yet regarded as *purely passive*.

Only on attaining the very highest step, viz., human science and art—where the external world is observed for the knowledge it brings; where one sees only for the sake of seeing; where one hears only for the sake of hearing; where even smelling and tasting are performed for the sake of smelling and tasting—only there it becomes plain and obvious that a specific art dwells in the senses, that we have to learn to see and hear as well as to speak and write, and that, in consequence of higher talents and cultivation, the sight and hearing of one is quite different, much more perfect than that of another. But all this will be treated of more fully on some other opportunity.

Here only this much: In all conscious and feeling beings we must unconditionally separate *Activity*, or action of the will on the outer world, and *Receptivity*, or the capacity of receiving or

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<sup>1</sup> Partout l'intelligence se montre unie à l'instinct; pas d'instinct possible sans une intelligence pour le diriger et dominer.—BLANCHARD.

suffering impressions from the same source ; we must consider them as final opposites. Still we must never forget that everywhere in nature there is inseparable unity, and that it is only our objective thinking which makes these distinctions and divisions, to gain thereby as comprehensive, clear, and intelligent a view as possible. Let us therefore constantly keep in mind the unity and incessant reciprocal action of these two separated poles. All expressions of will and dexterity, all performances of strength and adroitness, that we admire in animals, are only possible under the presupposition of their external senses—that is, their sensations and their constant co-operation. And the converse of this is true—the senses must grow finer, more sensitive, and therefore more perfect, the more they are practiced, the more they assist and control the outward manifestations of the animal's organs ; they, too, have a school and are learning an art. But both the mechanical perfection of the organization and the perceptions of the senses must act with unity, which, considered from one point of view, is *Volition*, from the other *Consciousness*. Both harmonize in another point: that a living being can never have a broader sphere of consciousness than that which is in accord with the purposes of its existence, and is of service to them. For instance: Consciousness of danger, a wider survey, a higher perception, without the power to make them available by a corresponding activity, and of use to its life, would make the existence of an animal insupportable and a torture.

Those external faculties which show themselves through the assistance of its senses, and through the power of which the animal (as a vital mechanism, perfectly adapted to the conditions of the element in which it moves) is able to carry out all the functions which are of use to its subsistence, as well as to the propagation and preservation of its kind, we may justly call, in the most general sense of the word, its *Art*.

What elements are there inherent in this idea, are inseparable from it, and therefore constitute its real essence? They are the following:

1. The idea of "*Können*" (power) or "*Vermögen*" (to be able to do) includes the idea that the being can at all times, according to its free inclination, therefore with consciousness, control this activity ; as Horace says: "*Ut quamvis tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque optimus est modulator.*" This idea rests in its last

grounds on the contrast between "*actu*" and "*potentia*" (*δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ*), a conception the immeasurable significance and extent of which Aristotle's philosophical penetration first perceived, and it has been reserved for the present day, which has learned to consider the universe as an unalterable sum of living and elastic forces, to make its entire immensity apparent.

2. Inseparable from the idea of Art is that of *Interest*, which is, as it were, the unity-idea (*Einheits-Idee*) of all life, and nearly identical with volition, only that it contains rather the objective side of the latter, the sum total of everything toward which its efforts and strivings are directed. From this follows, that for the same reason and as little as there can exist a perception or sensation that does not serve the ends of existence of the being, and therefore is in perfect accord with its whole activity (as we remarked above), just as little is an activity or a mechanical liberty (freedom) in a living being conceivable which does not concur with the unity of the life interests, and is attached to it by most indissoluble ties. This is just the organic unity, the unerring certainty, with which nature fits out all living beings for the maintenance of their existence with all powers and organs that most perfectly correspond with their ideas and conditions of life. Every organism is, according to its degree, perfectly teleological (or in perfect conformity to an inward design or purpose). "*Natura sibi ubique consentanea est.*"

3. This latter idea, conformity to an end or aim, can only appear after presupposing the two just-named ideas—viz.: a central-will, permeating and governing all parts of life and its functions, and its external interest. But nothing but the latter, and that only, gives to the idea of art meaning and perspicuity. And it is a fact that this idea was first formed and developed in the human mind by that branch of man's activity where conformity to the end in view appeared clearly and objectively. The creation of whatever answered to human needs and necessities—the work of artisans—was the first phenomenon and consideration from which the idea of art could spring and become generally current.

The infinite adaptability, laughing all human art to scorn, which we meet in the construction of the animal organism, and which is the cause of all those activities and dexterities which are in the

highest degree adapted to the preservation of its existence, has led, in consequence of the analogy from which proceeded a similar contemplation and comparison of these artistic organizations with human works, to a twofold, equally near, but equally precipitate, conclusion.

1. Either these organisms have been completely identified with human works of art, and therefore one has equally assumed an active creative intellect acting from without, through whose influence the whole wonderful structure has been accomplished (for to regard it as the effect of a chance meeting of unorganized matter is a resort which cannot satisfy any thinking being), and has not tired to this day of adducing this infinite adaptability to ends as the surest proof of the existence of a Creator, and of varying this so-called physico-theological proof in all possible keys.

2. Or one has, in incomprehensible blindness, identified all activities of the animal that proceed from design, especially those by which it creates external works, like the ant its hill, the bird its nest, etc., with human activity to such a degree that one has ascribed them to the reason, the thought of the animal! This absurdity—hatched by the most recent materialistic school, the gallant defenders of which did not even seem to see that in lifting the animals to such a height they were becoming apostates from their own doctrine, and were giving it its death-blow—is not worthy of serious refutation.<sup>1</sup>

What is it, then, that distinguishes human art in its deepest reason so much from animal art, as just characterized, and makes it at the same time belong so intimately to the special nature of man that it has been truly said, "*L'art est la nature même de l'homme*"? and as Longinus said: "Human art is not perfect till it seems to be Nature."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Any one wishing to investigate these things may compare the following excellent works: Reimarus's "Allgemeine Betrachtungen über die Triebe der Thiere, hauptsächlich über ihre Kunsttriebe"; Le Roy, "Lettres philosophiques sur l'intelligence et la perfectibilité des animaux"; Flourens, "Résumé analytique des observations de Fréd. Cuvier sur l'instinct et l'intelligence des animaux"; as also Schopenhauer in the second book of his "Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," vol. i, § 28; vol. ii, chaps. 26, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Περὶ ὕψους, § 22. Τότε ἡ τέχνη τέλειος, ἥνικ' ἀν φύσιν εἶναι δοκῇ. Similarly Herder, "Kalligone," p. 172: "Man, according to his kind, is an Art-Creature. The Being and the Well-being of his race are built on the use of active reason, working through the organs of sense; only through Art has he become what he is. *Art is to him, as Man, natural.*"

Let us say it in one word: Human art is activity, directed, elevated, perfected, multiplied, and made effective by *Reason*. Everything will depend, therefore, on apprehending clearly and correctly the definition of Reason.

In the foregoing it has already been pointed out that there can be no animal instinct that is not led by a certain degree of intelligence, comprehending the latter to mean conscious notice of casual external circumstances. A passage of Flourens, often quoted, will illustrate this best. "Everybody," says he, "knows the garden-spider, whose web is a perfect model of radii springing from a centre. I have often seen this spider, after it had just left its egg, spin its web; then instinct alone was acting; but when I tear its web, it repairs the damage, and will do it as often as I tear its work. Consequently there is in the spider, besides the purely mechanical instinct which creates the net, also a kind of intelligence which informs it of the places damaged, and in what part its instinct has to be active."

This faint light—which is burning in every animal, even in those of lowest forms, and which lights the path for its actions and will in the narrow bounds in which, according to its nature, it is confined, and, as it were, closed in—is developed in man to the radiant light of reason, which endows him with a plenitude of power, self-consciousness, and internal and external liberty, which sharply and without exception separates his entire activity—as one thoroughly conscious of its object—and frees it from everything which could be placed by its side from the animal world.

What, then, is the essence of this reason? How does it operate? How has it become a possibility? How came it first to a realization? And what connection does it hold with human art? Did it proceed from the latter, or, *vice versa*, did reason spring from art?

It is a notable fact that in our day nearly everybody acknowledges that art had a beginning—first, rude beginnings, hardly worthy of the name of Art—but is reluctant to admit the same of human Reason, being unable to divest himself of the idea that reason was inborn in primitive man, as if it were a power bequeathed to him in full perfection. How is this contradiction to be explained? Manifestly by the disinclination most people have for submitting to any but the most palpable arguments, and such



arguments can be brought forward for *Art* in the crudest and most primitive tools and art-effects, whereas the intimate connection of these with *Reason*—which is in itself a necessary preliminary condition for the origination of these art-objects, and as the oldest and petrified manifestation of which such antediluvian treasures ought to be regarded—is overlooked, or not heeded, as being insignificant and unessential. Only serious and conscientious thinkers are penetrated by the conviction that both are indissolubly connected, that such primitive art-objects point at the same time to a very primitive state of reason, that no progress of art is conceivable which does not at the same time involve a progress of reason, that is to say, has it as well as a consequence, as a presupposition. The latter seems paradoxical, but is easily explained by the infinitely small degrees in which all progress, and especially that of primeval times, advances, and the uninterrupted chain of reciprocal action between intuition and activity or skill.

But if there is to be any question of priority, it must be admitted that art always precedes reason by a step, and that, as is the case to this day, the productions of the former always increase the power of expression, and with it the insight and force of the latter. For instance, that an organism is nothing but a machine, and can only operate mechanically, could not penetrate the general understanding before the age of steam-engines; just in the same way, in primitive times, the idea of cutting, boring, etc., could not be thought of before the existence of the primitive stone-knife, borer, etc. The words of Aristotle, “One can only understand what one can make,” are simple truth.

This assertion receives another clear and unanswerable argument through the fact, as shown us in the animal world, that there is an art without reason, whereas reason without art—that is, without a heightened, multiplied activity of practical functions in the service of life—can nowhere and never be found.

The enormous transformation which human existence underwent, and which became possible and necessary through the gradual development of reason—and the result of it, a conscious stepping out of the sphere of the animal world—can best be summed up in the following simple formula: Animal is a living mechanism, and its intelligence only serves to make this mechanism move in its own proper way, in conformity with external cir-

circumstances. Man, on the other hand, creates, by virtue of his reason, the mechanism, which he makes subservient to his purposes.

Whereas in Animal the intellect reaches only far enough to be able to accommodate itself within certain bounds to external circumstances, human reason subjects to itself the external world and dictates laws to nature. A universal art confined by nothing, and therefore capable of any and every development, takes the place of individual art, as the living embodiments of which the separate kinds of animals might be regarded. Then there awakens in man a desire for knowledge, which is in its most primitive form curiosity—a sort of intellectual craving for mental food, as hunger is a physical one.

I have treated this subject in detail in my work, “*Das Werkzeug und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit*,” which discusses the outward active life of humanity extricating itself from the bonds of the animal world, consequently treats of the beginnings of human art, and must therefore be considered as a necessary complement, as the objective counterpart, to my “*Origin of Language*” (“*Ursprung der Sprache*”), the significance of which is really the origin of reason. Both works combined contain the solution of the question of the origin of man.

But here we wish to show the necessity of the connection between reason and art, to show the common root from which both have sprung, and make their true essence—that is, the truly *human* in them palpable.

The most important principle through which this can and must be done is *Tradition* or *Continuous-Life* (*Folgeleben*) [or participation in the life of the social whole].

The causal efficiency of the animal terminates with its individual existence. All experiences which it might gain in the narrow sphere which encloses its existence are lost again, as it has neither a possibility nor an interest to impart them to a being of its own kind. All its capacities are, therefore, only transmitted to its descendants directly through *Generation*. How? is even to the present day a great secret. But the fact is firmly established. The bird sings its natural song and builds its artistic nest without having learnt how to do it; the young beaver constructs its lodge, the young badger burrows its nest without the least instruction,

without ever having seen anything like it. That in the course of long periods of time modifications take place in this natural activity no sensible person will deny; that some bird must have built a nest for the first time, some beaver a lodge and dam, is an inference of logic; but it is certain and without doubt that all these abilities are only transmitted by birth and inheritance.

How entirely different in Man! Here we find a conscious transmission of intellect and skill in art, an interest in imparting and instructing tradition and imitation, a connection between succeeding generations which in no way can be traced back to what is innate to nature; the proof of which can be found in observing that all human activities proper, belonging here, would never develop without the pale of this association [social combination], so they can only become the property of the individual by *learning*.

In the first place, it is easy to understand, if it were not known to every one of us by experience, that such a collection and transmission of the knowledge and skill of succeeding generations could not but lead to astonishing results in the course of time; so that human culture and development of power would pour down through the thousands of years like a strong, constantly increasing river, forming at last a mighty ocean, which at this present day has become able itself to feed and preserve all its springs and tributaries, just as the enormous expanse of water which surrounds the continent feeds and keeps in never-ending circulation all the rivers flowing through and fructifying the country.

We, therefore, readily understand that it is solely this "continuous life" which can explain the grand miracle of the immeasurable power and glory of man, and we feel an ardent desire awoken in us to know how this continuous life originated, how it became possible, and how a reality. Let us therefore, with our whole mind and fervent zeal, strive to find an answer to this question—a question of loftier interest to human reason than any other, for it treats of its own origin.

The only safe way in all highest and most important questions is to conduct the inquiry according to the supreme principles of reason (as Kant calls them). We shall therefore proceed according to the three Analogies of Experience (Permanence, Consequence, and Reciprocal Action).

We shall therefore ask :

1. What was the most important *cause* of the setting in of the "continuous life" [solidarity of life, participation of each in the life of the whole], or (which means the same) of its becoming permanent?

2. What was its most important *effect*?

3. What was the most important *medium* which, joining cause to effect, produced a continuous reciprocal action, and, in unison with it, a chain of reciprocal actions, each effect becoming in its turn a cause, so that, through the extent and number of its effects and their interlacings, a constantly increasing progress, tending to infinitude, became possible?

To the first question I respond: It was, is, and will remain, the interparticipation of wills, or sympathy. This reason, which unites a large number of individual wills into a single one, is *ethical*. It is the indispensable condition and presupposition of all community of life. Take Sympathy away, and all life in communion—consequently, also, its most important product, reason—becomes impossible. That life in communion continues can only be explained through this ethical factor as ultimate root. In deducing, as many do (even Kant among others), ethics and social life from reason, they confound the cause with the means—Volition, which is primordial, with the consciousness of Volition, which is secondary. Reason is cold and calm; it has regard only for end and means; it does not act in us, it only helps us to act; it does not glow for the whole; it does not subordinate egotistical will to higher aims; it does not sacrifice; it does not renounce, nor hope, nor suffer, for it knows nothing of love; it is nothing but the faithful mirror that reflects everything, the external world as well as our inner emotions; but all those emotions, whether noble or ignoble, good or bad, spring from quite another source—from the heart, the will. This will, which in the single individual we call character, is what endures, never changes—the tree that bears fruit according to its kind. And so the common or ethical will (sympathy) is the true and only reason for the permanence of social life, *i. e.*, continuous life.

The second question I answer by saying: The most important effect of this community of the will of individual beings is communion of action, which, as I have shown in another place,<sup>1</sup> falls

<sup>1</sup> "Die Lehre Kant's und der Ursprung der Vernunft," p. 379.

still within the bounds of the animal world—for which examples can easily be cited, as when wolves or dogs hunt their prey in packs, buffaloes or monkeys defend themselves in herds. The province of humanity begins with the community of productive activity, and in it lies the true source of this higher continuous life which is directed and supported by reason. In it lie also the beginnings—that is, the first manifestations—of those ideas of right, property, and value which are inseparable from the idea of man, which, if permitted, I shall treat of fully in a separate work; here our concern lies with human art and skill. Let us then show how, through this social life, the natural and unconscious could, and had to, pass under the rule of art and consciousness.

It is certain that the creations of primitive man were little different from what we find analogous among higher animals; indeed, I believe that the constructions of the beaver far excel them in ingenuity. But there was one thing which promised them a great future—they were social affairs. The mound of earth, or the nest made of the branches of trees, was not for the single individual, to use it for himself and his young—as is the case everywhere, and without exception, in the animal world (for the constructions made in common by birds or beavers and others are only *aggregates*); they were, on the contrary, created through the joint will and combined activity of many. It would be well here to observe and weigh the first sign of reciprocal action; how union, in *giving permanence, obtains permanence!* For the work jointly finished, the dwelling becomes a tie; it unites all the members of the flock, and does it by the equal interest which each one has in the whole. So it is not love alone that is acting, but also egotistical interest; the two most potent powers unite, and in their unity become invincible. And so it has remained to this day; human beings who bear each other deadly hatred are kept together by interest; the largest part of the marriages that occur show only an extinct and chilly heap of ashes on the altar of home, but the walls of the house surround the unwilling parties, and the unity of interest makes an escape impossible. Not less important nor powerful is another effect of this reciprocal relation—that between the *whole* and the *single individuals*; the former consists of nothing but the latter, but, nevertheless, exercises an unlimited power over the individual. For the strong and mighty carry the weak

and timid along with them, supplying them with self-confidence, which everybody feels who knows himself to be a member of a larger body, and the want of which often tortures the one excluded into self-destruction; no plague, no leprosy, was feared as much as the excommunications of the Druids or of the Christian Church. The most important product of this reciprocal relation is *Discipline* in the twofold sense of the word—to wit, training and instruction. All instruction is a training of the will, and only by these means is man's skill in art trained or developed. The important point here is that this is not done by a foreign will, but by that of their own totality, which in this wise alone maintains and develops itself. Therefore, what the present day calls art tradition—and the reverse of which is considered to be objective dabbling, or subjective vagaries—has been the oldest human tradition; indeed, the very germ which enclosed the whole of human continuous life, its ethical (preceding) side as well as its reason, or intellectual side. The instruction of the young generation was at first a natural, but soon became a conscious, task of the community, for by instruction consciousness is first awakened. All skill in art, simple as it was in primitive times, had to be developed, learned, and to become a conscious exercise in this way. It would have remained unconscious if the individuals had always separated themselves from the community and made use of their inborn skill—*i. e.*, animal art—for the maintenance of their own lives as separate individuals. The twofold reciprocal action here explained between the *Creator* and the *Creation*, and between the *Community* and the *Individual*, leads up to the answer of the third question: What was the most important medium in the care and preservation of this life of community and continuity?

Without hesitation I answer: "Language, for she is the mother of reason, even reason herself."

In the foregoing I stated that animal organism was distinguished from pure mechanism by *consciousness*; that all animal art and mechanical skill must be subservient to the central will of the animal by a certain degree of consciousness. This consciousness increases by aid of the external senses, and the intellect of the animal reaches as far as it is internally conscious of its own power of action, and exercises it appropriately under the control of its external senses.

The distinguishing feature of human art—an art that constantly renews itself in the continuous life of generations, and thereby aspires and grows higher and higher—lies evidently in the consciousness of *Community*, which has its two bases or double roots in community of *Volition* and community of *Action*. Without this consciousness of community—the preliminary step to human reason, which, since then, has carefully guarded this characteristic—a solicitude for tradition, and therefore the training and instruction of the growing generations in art, could not be imagined.

Nobody will now be surprised if I here say that this consciousness of community was forced from within to seek a means of *Expression*, and that it found it, finally, in language.

Those that have read my former writings will know what I am aiming at, and will rejoice with me at the perfect agreement of the result, obtained on this, another road, with my theory of the origin of language in other works.

Consciousness of community and the desire to communicate are so closely and nearly related ideas that it is hard to conceive how one can exist without the other. The desire to communicate is an urgent impulse; from it sound is born, as we can daily observe in deaf-mutes, infants, even in dogs, for their barking is an attempt to speak, and only acquired by living with man. But sound is no language; it has no meaning; it is only the expression of the inner subjective emotion, which cannot be an object of rational thinking, but only of sympathetic feeling of congenial beings. To become a vehicle of communication, it must take to itself a means of comprehension, an object—which, intimately united with it, becomes capable of *reminding* every one of the same idea.

What else could this object be than the only thing understood in those primeval times, of mere dawning reason, the only thing all understood—for what can we understand but that which we can make?—the product of the common activity, the common *Work*?

I need not here stop to repeat the numerous proofs brought forward on the same subject and reached by different roads, laid down in my writings. It is hard to preach to deaf ears, and, I am grateful to say, the disagreeable task of forcibly removing the morbid matter which clogs these ears is not for me.

So it was art that bore human thought in her lap, and from which it came forth a weak, helpless, lisping child; and then a tremor went through the world, for the moment had come when mind tore itself free from obtuse matter, and commenced on angel's wings its flight toward pure ethereal heights.

All language is poetry. All power of expression was given to her by Art, all that enriches her to this day, and always comes to her in no other way. But only those that are called to it can truly enrich her. "Chemistry," says Jacob Grimm, "jabbbers Greek and Latin; in Liebig's mouth, it becomes a powerful language."

Art gives to thought externality, and, in doing this, it *creates* it first. Thought gives to art inwardness. Its body, language, is the all-powerful medium of keeping, upholding, communicating, and propagating—in other words, is the real continuous life of all human knowledge, power, and volition. Banish these delicate aërial forms, and all that is human will become rigid, and die like the life of the individual when his breath forsakes him.

The river of tradition flows solely through the river-bed of language. The word is the imperishable seal of the human mind, the clearest mirror of the thought and spirit of each succeeding period of time. Whatever was *known* was *named*, and, if anything had no name, it is the surest sign that it was not known.

We have shown how word as a connecting link stepped in, a real *medium* between volition and power, between creator and creation; how it took hold of both in their *reciprocal action* and laid them down as thought in the consciousness of man, and with it reciprocal action began its never-ending play.

For the word binds together minds, and, in going forth from the mouth of one man and entering the ear of another, it awakens in him the same thought, which is yet as another, and, therefore, returns enriched in meaning to him who sent it; in this way, in increasing reciprocal speech and reciprocal action, growing ever clearer, more perfect, more conscious, it travels through generations of man, uniting the living with the dead, and already now preparing future perspicuity for unborn generations.

But mightier still, and inexhaustible in plenitude and multiformity, is the reciprocal action which is consummated between things. Drawn into the realm of human action are the eternal stars, which



from their unattainable heights proclaim their harmonies to the calculation of the sages, and through them trace the safest path for the mariner on the lonely depths of the oceans. Foreknown is the shadow which after thousands of years shall veil the light of the sun, and which formerly filled the souls of men with dreadful fears. All the zones of the earth exchange their products, all that is accomplished in the world becomes mutual property of knowledge, and nothing important happens that does not speed on wings of thought from one end of the world to the other. The will of man, who joins countries and continents by boring through the everlasting mountains, and bridges over the immeasurable oceans by the fine line of thought laid low in the depths of its waters, accomplishes all these miracles by nothing but the winged messenger, the faint breath of his mouth, which flies hither and thither in restless haste and joins the most distant things to each other, no less than the minds that are separated by immense spaces of thousands of years. Immortal companion of mortal man, how grand and amazing is thy power! Through thee humanity is formed into one consciousness, into one single experienced mind, the blessings of which every single individual enjoys, and has only to acquire, retain, and continue a small part of this consciousness.

This is not the place to present in detail the incomparable importance and significance of language in the accomplishment of an intellectual continuous life. This task may be left to him who in future days will venture on the bold enterprise of writing a "History of Reason." I bid him welcome to-day. From this logograph they will—and with better reason than from the old ones—date the commencement of the real history of the world. In the meanwhile, flow on, ye tears of youth, tortured by names, dates, battles, and treaties; and bloom yet awhile in your obscurity, ye dust-born pedants of driest philology, who by your senseless logomachy and word-catching have succeeded in imbuing the majority of thinking people with thorough disgust for the most glorious thing that the world holds—language!

I must here call attention to a very important difference between *Instruction* and *Intellectual Tradition*. This difference corresponds, on a higher plane, to the difference already stated between the inborn skill of the animal and its intellect. Intel-

lectual tradition, carried on continually through the organ of language, improves the intellect of the young human individuals, and makes them participants of reason; it is the all-embracing means of every instruction. But is such a purely intellectual tradition sufficient? Is it sufficient to have a thing in one's mind and be able to say it in words? Certainly not. As the young painter must to this day educate his arm and hand as well as his eye by constantly practicing and contemplating the models of present and former masters, as every art is only preserved and developed by such practical tradition—*i. e.*, instruction—just so, in primitive times, growing generations had to practice incessantly the very primitive skill in art of the first founders of human power and grandeur, and they had to do it under direction and by imitation of their elders, who already knew how to manufacture the rough stone implements, how to use them, to cut the tree, or weave the branches. Even the organ of intellectual tradition, language—regarding it as an art, *i. e.*, the movement of the organs of voice—could not then, and cannot to this day, be imparted to the child in any other way. Therefore language, regarded from this point of view, is also nothing but a skill acquired by imitation (repeating what is said), and therefore an object of instruction. But its *contents*, that which is *thought* in making the sounds, form the object of tradition. And this embraces all the rest, but as *Knowledge*, not as *Power*. “*Doctus*,” among the Romans, referred to both, but the “*Viri Docti*” speak of tactics, strategy, agriculture, etc., according to books!

We have now drawn a distinct boundary-line between animal and human art, which, by reason of its origin, must be thoroughly clear and intelligible to everybody. As we insisted that the most important character of the former was its being inborn, *not* learned, and must absolutely serve only the interest of the purpose of existence of the individual being, and no other interests—just as definitely do we characterize human art by saying it is not inborn; it has to be developed in each single individual, consequently learned, and from this follows just as certainly that it does not exclusively serve individual, but also other purposes.

This truth sheds a distinct light on the former confused attempts to make an absolute distinction between animal instinct and human understanding or reason, without anybody being able

to state just what he wished to be understood by the former or the latter. "Words, mere words," as in so many human disputes! A nearer approach toward truth was made when Kant<sup>1</sup> and Reimarus first framed the definition that the idea of instinct embraced everything which, *without being learned*, was done unconsciously and suitable to the end in view. The reason for this definition they were unable to give; they simply stated the fact.

We know now what this negative definition "without being learned" means. With the animal (excepting the exceedingly trifling sum of what in its life it may learn for itself) all learning is training (breaking in) in the service of man, not its own nature. The ox yoked to the plough, the horse docile to its rider, have experienced a "*capitis deminutio*," a degradation, since "Jove took their day of Liberty and with it the half of their strength."

In the human being, on the other hand, a miracle has been enacted; what he learns is his own nature, as to subdue the primitive savage instinct of nature is the principal task of all education. The whole man and everything human must be formed, developed, and educated.

And how did this miracle become possible? Only by the educator and the educated, the teacher and the taught being one and the same being. This seeming paradox has lost all incongruity; by our treatment it has become clear and comprehensible. The newly-formed organism, the social community, with the interest of the individual and of the whole inseparably united, creates a never-dying, continuous life, the products of which—language, reason, rights and morals, sciences and arts—are carried and perfected from generation to generation, and insure to humanity an ever-increasing power and internal perfection.

And with this we have also drawn the boundary-line between *Nature* and *Culture* in their general opposition. Culture is everything which humanity—since it has been humanity, *i. e.*, a social organism—has acquired of ability, knowledge, and skill in the community, and which it preserves to the community with never-tiring zeal; indeed, with a stern solemnity which proves its principles of life are at stake. The organic powers spring from nature; the intellectual are the special property of man.

<sup>1</sup> Muthmasslicher, *Anfang*, etc., p. 367, Rosenkranz. I mention this because latterly Darwin has always been called the originator of this definition.

Whether, according to this view, language, the essentially and exclusively human, must be reckoned nature or culture, every one may answer for himself.

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## THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPERIENCE AGAINST IDEALISM.

BY GEORGE S. FULLERTON.

"Poor philosopher Berkeley," wrote Doctor Arbuthnot to Swift, in 1714, "has now the *idea* of health, which was very hard to produce in him; for he had an *idea* of a strange fever upon him, so strong that it was very hard to destroy it by introducing a contrary one."

Arbuthnot's jest is the first on record of that innumerable host of jests, criticisms, and condemnations of the Berkeleyan Idealism which have repeated themselves in each succeeding age, and each successive harvest of which has sprung from the same old root of misconception and misinterpretation. Swift, to whom the above letter was directed, is said to have left Berkeley standing at the door in the rain, on the ground that, if his philosophy were true, he could enter as well with the door shut as open. Dr. Johnson confuted the system by kicking a large stone—"striking his foot with mighty force against it." "Pray, sir, don't leave us," said he on another occasion, as a gentleman who had been defending Berkeley's views was about to take his departure, "for we may perhaps forget to think of you, and then you will cease to exist." "According to this doctrine," said Voltaire in his "Philosophical Dictionary," "ten thousand men killed by ten thousand cannon-shots are in reality nothing more than ten thousand apprehensions of our understanding." Beattie, in his "Essay on Truth," speaks of "Berkeley's pretended proof of the non-existence of matter at which common sense stood aghast," and declares that on the basis of this philosophy one can have no evidence that any being exists in nature but himself.

Everywhere we find it accepted as a notorious fact that there